Is Russia Surpassing Ukraine in Drone Manufacturing?

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the utilization of drones on both sides was relatively sparse. At that time, only a limited number of small drones were in operation. Fast forward to today, and drones have become an integral part of the conflict, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces employing them extensively for various purposes, including surveillance, artillery spotting, and precision strikes. Ukraine, leveraging its vibrant tech startup ecosystem, rapidly embraced this technology. Over 200 Ukrainian companies now manufacture military drones, bolstered by a network of non-profits and volunteer organizations that support and enhance drone capabilities. In contrast, Russia’s adoption of drone technology has been hampered by its centralized control and dependency on state-run monopolies, which has slowed its technological adaptation. Despite this, Russia’s vast resources and industrial capabilities could become increasingly significant as the conflict drags on.

The conflict has been characterized as the “first drone war,” with General Schill, the Chief of Staff of the French Army, estimating that drones are now responsible for approximately 80% of the destruction. This raises the question: is Russia gaining a technological edge in this crucial aspect of modern warfare?

Samuel Bendett, an expert on Russian drone technology and an adviser to both the CNA and CNAS think tanks, provides a detailed perspective on Russia’s drone operations. His X/Twitter account serves as a crucial source of information, offering a window into the Russian approach to uncrewed warfare. This includes a wide array of perspectives, from factory-level production to battlefield deployment, and encompasses views from volunteers and military strategists alike. According to Bendett, the Russian military’s initial foray into small drones began in 2021. However, by the time of the invasion in early 2022, their use was minimal. While some Russian militias in Donetsk utilized commercial quadcopters, these were not adopted by regular forces due to their lack of resilience against electronic warfare and other countermeasures.

Electronic jamming has been a persistent issue throughout the conflict, with drones and jammers engaging in a constant technological cat-and-mouse game. Many commercial drones were rendered ineffective by jamming, particularly in the initial stages of the war. Nevertheless, enough drones managed to complete their missions, underscoring their importance in modern combat scenarios. As the war has progressed, the Russian military has increasingly recognized the strategic value of small drones. Current estimates suggest that Russia’s production of military drones could reach up to one million annually. However, the acceptance and integration of these drones are still inconsistent. Some Russian commanders have been slow to understand the strategic advantages of drones, leading to uneven deployment and utilization at the tactical level.

Resistance within the Russian military has led to delays in the procurement of small quadcopters. Many of these drones are not acquired through official military channels but are instead sourced by volunteer organizations. These groups often procure drones from China or assemble them from Chinese parts. Bendett highlights that the majority of small drone and FPV (First Person View) production and procurement in Russia is handled by volunteers rather than the military itself. Although the military claims to have a pipeline for acquiring small drones, there is little evidence from front-line reports to support the effective distribution of these drones. Consequently, many drones are assembled directly on the front lines by volunteers and soldiers.

The involvement of volunteers in drone production and distribution often bypasses government and Ministry of Defence channels. This decentralized approach has resulted in significant disparities in the quality and quantity of drones available to different Russian units. The variation in drone availability and effectiveness is evident, with some units being well-equipped while others lack sufficient drone support. This situation has led to frequent requests for drones from soldiers via Telegram channels, reflecting the inadequacies of the official supply chain.

Recently, President Putin instructed the Ministry of Defence, now under the newly appointed Defence Minister Belousov, to strengthen collaboration with volunteer groups. However, integrating these volunteer efforts with official military operations presents a complex challenge.

Historically, Russian Tsars were known for granting monopolies to their favorites, a practice that appears to have continued into modern times. The Sudoplatov Battalion, a prominent producer of FPV drones, has established a near-monopoly in this field. The group claims to produce over a thousand drones daily, with a significant portion of components sourced domestically. Sudoplatov’s success has resulted in an official partnership with the Ministry of Defence, although the specifics of their funding and contract terms are kept confidential. This exclusive arrangement has led to discontent among other Russian drone developers and volunteers, who advocate for a more varied and decentralized approach to drone production and deployment.

Sudoplatov’s VT-40 drones, which have remained unchanged in specification since their introduction, have become increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian jamming tactics. This lack of adaptability contrasts with the Ukrainian approach, where drone manufacturers quickly adjust their technology based on battlefield feedback. Despite criticism, Sudoplatov’s dominance in the FPV drone market may be waning, as Russian state media begin to highlight other emerging drone projects, such as Ghoul, Joker, and Piranha. However, these new developments have yet to significantly impact the battlefield.

Russia’s large size and extensive volunteer network have facilitated a substantial drone production effort, potentially exceeding Ukraine’s output. Nevertheless, the quality and consistency of these drones are often compromised. Many Russian drones suffer from poor construction and lack of standardization, leading to operational failures. A notable issue is that a significant portion of Russian drones are downed by their own jamming systems before reaching Ukrainian lines, due to coordination problems between electronic warfare units and drone operators.

Russian volunteers have reported issues with Sudoplatov’s drones, including poor build quality, with a third of the drones failing to take off. When these drones do reach Ukrainian lines, they face sophisticated countermeasures. Despite efforts to replicate Ukrainian drone tactics, Russian drone operations lag in effectiveness. Bendett notes that Russian drone operators face challenges with training, tactics, and coordination. Ukrainian FPV operators report hit rates ranging from 20% to 50%, while Russian operators often achieve much lower success rates.

Despite these challenges, Russia is gradually improving its drone production capabilities, with a potential output of up to 100,000 military quadcopters per month. The transparency of equipment deficiencies on social media contrasts with the secrecy that typically shrouded equipment shortcomings in past conflicts. The future of Russian drone warfare will likely hinge on overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and harnessing the innovative potential of volunteer groups.

As Bendett concludes, “Russia’s ability to adapt and scale these developments will be crucial. The ongoing war presents a significant learning curve, and Russia’s larger production capacity could become advantageous if effectively utilized.”